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Abstract 
 
This study examines the impact of corporate governance and financial leverage on the value of 
American firms. This study also seeks to extend the findings of Gill and Mathur (2011a). A 
sample of 333 firms listed on New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) for a period of 3 years from 
2009-2011 was selected. The co-relational and non-experimental research design was used to 
conduct this study. Overall, findings show that larger board size negatively impacts the value of 
American firms, and CEO duality, audit committee, financial leverage, firm size, return on 
assets, and insider holdings positively impact the value of American firms. The impact of 
corporate governance and financial leverage differs between manufacturing and service 
industries. Results show that board size negatively impacts the value of American manufacturing 
firms, and CEO duality, audit committee, financial leverage, firm size, and insider holdings 
positively impact the value of American manufacturing firms. Findings also show that board size 
negatively impacts the value of American service firms, and financial leverage and return on 
assets positively impact the value of American service firms. This study contributes to the 
literature on the factors that affect firm value. The findings may be useful for financial managers, 
investors, and financial management consultants.   
 
Keywords: CEO duality, Board size, Audit committee, Insider holdings, Financial leverage, 
Firm size, Firm value.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Maximizing shareholders’ wealth is one of the corporate goals that cannot be ignored. The 
market value of the firm is an important measure of the shareholders’ wealth. Corporate 
governance and financial leverage play a big role in maximization of shareholders’ wealth. 
While good corporate governance plays an important role in increasing market value of the firm 
(Black, 2001; Klapper and Love, 2004; Gompers et al., 2003; Beiner and Dchmid, 2005; Rouf, 
2011; Gill and Mathur, 2011a), higher financial leverage decrease firm value by increasing 
bankruptcy risk. Therefore, sound corporate governance and an optimal capital structure are 
necessary for every firm to enhance the market value of the firm. Corporate governance is 
defined as the system by which business corporations are directed and controlled (Kajola, 2008, 
p. 16). An optimal capital structure includes some debt, but not 100% debt. It is a "best" 
debt/equity ratio for the firm that minimizes the cost of financing and reduces the chances of 
bankruptcy (Gill, Biger, and Mathur, 2011). Cuong and Canh (2012) found that the optimal debt 
ratio (total debt to total assets ratio) should not exceed 59.27% because a higher debt ratio 
negatively impacts firm value.  
 
The financial scandals (e.g., Livent Inc., Corel Corporation, and Nortel) around the world and 
collapse of major institutions in the USA (e.g., Enron, World Com, Commerce Bank, and XL 
Holidays) have shaken investors’ faith in capital markets and the efficacy of existing corporate 
governance practices in promoting transparency and accountability (Gill and Mathur, 2011b). 
The shaken faith of investors has a negative impact on the market value per share and 
consequently overall value of the firm. On the other hand, higher financial leverage increases the 
chances of bankruptcy, which in turn, shake investors’ faith in capital markets. Thus, both 
corporate governance and financial leverage impact on the value of the firm.     
 
While Berle and Means (1932) were the first authors of corporate governance theory, Modiglani 
and Miller (1958) pioneered capital structure theory. Since those time periods, different authors 
tried to follow their paths to develop new theories. For example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
defined agency relationship (i.e., a contract between agent and principal to perform services on 
behalf of the principal).  
 
Since growth in firm value is very important to maximize shareholders’ wealth and to achieve 
overall corporate goals and objectives, it is important to explore all the possible factors that 
impact the value of the firm. Corporate governance and financial leverage of firms are important 
factors that impact on the value of the firm. Therefore, this study examines the impact of 
corporate governance and financial leverage on firm value. The results can be generalized to 
service and manufacturing firms.   
 
The proxy variables were selected from previous empirical work. The set of proxy variables 
includes nine factors: CEO Duality, Board Size, Audit Committee, Financial Leverage, Firm 
Size, Return on Assets, Insider Holdings, Industry Dummy, and firm value.  
 
This study contributes to the literature on the relationships between corporate governance, 
financial leverage, and firm value in at least two ways. First, it focuses on American firms while 
very limited research has been conducted on such firms recently. Second, this study validates the 
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findings of previous authors by testing the relationships between corporate governance, financial 
leverage, and firm value of the sample firms. Thus, this study adds substance to the existing 
theory developed by previous authors.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Good corporate governance is an important factor in improving the value of the firm. The impact 
of corporate governance differs country to country because of disparate corporate governance 
structures resulting from dissimilar social, economic, and regulatory conditions (Rouf, 2011). 
This is also the case with financial leverage. Financial leverage has different impacts on the 
value of the firm country to country because of the different tax brackets and tax laws of 
different countries.   
 
Corporate governance, in the context of this study, is defined as set of processes, customs, 
policies, laws, and institutions affecting the way the firm is directed and controlled (Rouf, 2011). 
According to Kajola (2008, p. 17), the business of a firm is managed under the direction of a 
board of directors who delegates to the CEO and other management staff (the day to day 
management of the affairs of the firm). The directors, with their wealth of experience, provide 
leadership and direct the affairs of the business with a high sense of integrity, commitment to the 
firm, its business plans, and long-term shareholder value.  
 
It is believed that larger board size negatively impacts the value of the firm. Rouf (2011, p. 238) 
argues that small board size is generally believed to improve the value of the firm because the 
benefit by larger boards of increased monitoring are outweighed by the poor communication and 
decision making of larger groups. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) also indicate that 
the larger board size is less effective. It is, however, believed that if the CEO is the Chairman of 
the Board, the firm value is improved because CEO duality improved firm performance 
(Ramdani and Witteloostuijn, 2010).  
 
The audit committee also plays an important role in the improvement of firm value by 
implementing corporate governance principles. The principles of corporate governance suggest 
that the audit committee should work independently and perform their duties with professional 
care. The audit committee monitors mechanisms that improve quality of information flows 
between shareholders and managers (Rouf, 2011, p. 240), which in turn, help minimize agency 
problems.  
 
Although, insider holding contributes to enhancing firm value, its impact differs market to 
market. Bhabra (2007) found that firm value is sensitive to differences in governance structures 
across markets. The empirical studies on the impact of corporate governance and financial 
leverage on firm value are as follows: 
 
Black (2001) collected data from Russia and found that a firm's corporate governance behavior 
can have a huge effect on its market value. 
 
Gompers et al. (2003) used incidence of 24 governance rules to construct a “Governance Index” 
to proxy for the level of shareholder rights at about 1,500 large firms from the USA during the 
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1990s. The authors found that the firms with stronger shareholder rights had higher firm value; 
that is, strong corporate governance improves the value of the firm. 
 
Klapper and Love (2004) used data on firm-level corporate governance rankings across 14 
emerging markets to conduct research on corporate governance. Their results suggest that firms 
can partially compensate for ineffective laws and enforcement by establishing good corporate 
governance and providing credible investor protection.  
   
Mak and Kusnadi (2005) collected data from Singapore and Malaysia, and found a negative 
relationship between the board size and firm value. 
 
Sharma (2006) took a sample of Indian manufacturing firms and found that there is a direct 
relationship between firm value and financial leverage. 
 
Pattanayak (2008) examined the effect of insider ownership on corporate value in India for the 
periods of 2000-2001 and 2003-2004, using 1833 Bombay stock Exchange listed firms. The 
author found that firm value (measured by Tobin's Q) increases as ownership by insiders rises.  
 
Rouf (2011) examined Bangladeshi firms and found a positive relationship between CEO duality 
and firm value.  
 
Gill and Mathur (2011a) took a sample of 91 Canadian manufacturing firms listed on the 
Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) for a period of three years [from 2008-2010] and found that 
board size negatively impact of firm value, and CEO duality, firm size, and return on assets 
positively impact the firm’s value.  
 
Ryu and Yoo (2011) collected data from Korea and found a positive relationship between firm 
value and inside management ownership. 
 
Ruan, Tian, and Ma (2011) used data of Chinese firms and found that managerial ownership 
negatively impacts the ratio of total debt to total assets and the ratio of total debt to total assets 
negatively impacts firm value.  
 
Cheng and Tzeng (2011) collected data from 645 companies listed in the Taiwan Securities 
Exchange (TSE) from 2000-2009 and found a positive relationship between leverage and firm 
value. 
 
Adeyemi and Oboh (2011) took a sample size of 90 firms from Nigeria and found that the 
market value of a firm is positively influenced by its choice of capital structure (financial 
leverage). 
 
Cuong and Canh (2012) used a data set that included a combination of SEAs (seafood processing 
enterprises) listed on two of Vietnam’s stock exchange markets from 2005 - 2010. The authors 
found that the optimal debt ratio (total debt to total assets ratio) of less than 59.27% enhances 
firm value.   
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In summary, the literature review shows that both corporate governance and financial leverage 
affect firm value.  
 
3. Methods 
 
The co-relational and non-experimental research design was used to conduct this study.  
 
3.1 Measurement 
 
To remain consistent with previous studies, measures pertaining to i) CEO Duality, Board Size, 
Audit Committee, and Tobin’s Q were taken from Kyereboah-Coleman (2007), ii) Financial 
Leverage, Firm Size, and Return on Assets were taken from Gill and Mathur (2011b), and iii) 
insider holdings were taken from Abor and Biekpe (2007). 
 
Table 1 shows the measurements of the dependent, independent, and control variables that 
impact on firm value. 
 
Table 1: Proxy Variables and their Measurements 
 
Regression Equation: Q =  + 1CDit + 2BSit + 3ACit + 4FLit + 5FSit + 6ROAit + 7IHit + 8Indit + μit 
Variables Measurement 
Firm Value (Dependent Variable - Qi,t)  Q = (Market value of equity + Book value of debt) / Book  
value of total assets 
CEO Duality (Independent Variable - CDi,t) Assigned value 1 if same person occupied the post of the  
chairperson and the CEO and 0 for otherwise 
Board Size (Independent Variable - BSi,t) Measured as total number of directors serving on board 
Audit Committee (Independent Variable - ACi,t) Measured as total number of audit committee members 
Financial Leverage (Independent Variable - FLi,t)  FL = Total liabilities / Total assets 
Firm Size (Control Variable - FSi,t)  Measured as log of total assets 
Return on Assets (Control Variable - ROAi,t) Net income / Total assets 
Insider Holdings (Control Variable - IHi,t) Measured as percentage of insider share holdings  
Industry Dummy (Control Variable - Indi,t) Assigned value 1 for manufacturing industry and 0 for  
service industry 
μi,t = the error term 
Qi,t = Value of firm i in time t 
Q = Tobin’s Q 
 
3.2 Data Collection 
 
A database was built from a selection of approximately 800 financial-reports that were made 
public by publicly traded companies between January 1, 2009 and December 31, 2011. The 
selection was drawn from Mergent Online [http://www.mergentonline.com/compsearch.asp] to 
draw a random sample of American firms. Out of approximately 800 financial-reports 
announced by public companies between January 1, 2009 and December 31, 2011, only 333 
financial reports were usable. The cross sectional yearly data were used in this study. Thus, 333 
financial reports resulted in 999 total observations. Since a random sampling method was used to 
select companies, the sample is considered as a representative sample. 
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For the purpose of this study, certain industries were omitted due to the type of activity. For 
example, all financial services companies were omitted. In addition, some of the firms were not 
included in the data due to lack of information for the time periods under study.   
 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
  
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of independent, dependent, and control variables. The 
explanation on descriptive statistics is as follows: 
i) Total observations: 333 x 3 = 999  
ii) BS: 10.25 millions 
iii) AC: 4.09 
iv) FL: 54% 
v) ROA: 7% 
vi) IH: 8% 
vii) Q (Tobin’s Q): 3.08 
 
Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics (2009-2011) 
 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
BS 3 18 10.25 2.34 
AC 1 10 4.09 1.37 
FL 0.08 0.97 0.54 0.18 
FS 1.87 5.13 3.51 0.62 
ROA -0.020 0.35 0.07 0.05 
IH 0.01 0.88 0.08 0.14 
Q 1.08 25.71 3.08 2.95 
 
3.4 Bivariate Correlation Analysis 
 
The Pearson correlation was used to measure the degree of the linear association between 
independent and dependent variables. It was used to find how closely related two variables are 
(e.g., CD and Q). This relationship is assumed to be linear, and the correlation is a measure of 
how tightly clustered data points are about a correlation line. Correlation ranges from -1 to +1. 
 
Overall, Q is positively correlated with CD, AC, and FS. In the manufacturing industry, Q is 
positively correlated with CD, AC, FL, and FS. In the service industry, Q is positively correlated 
with FL and FS (see Table 3).  
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Table 3: Pearson Bivariate Correlation Analysis 
 
Entire Sample (N = 333) 
 Q CD BS AC FL FS ROA IH Ind 
Q  1 0.117* 0.058 0.168** 0.405** 0.229** -0.002 0.047 0.030 
CD   1 0.067 0.063 -0.007 0.140* 0.063 -0.088 0.128* 
BS    1 0.439** 0.252** 0.463** -0.022 -0.109* -0.082 
AC     1 0.080 0.328** -0.015 -0.117* 0.097 
FL      1 0.354** -0.247** -0.053 -0.096 
FS       1 -0.138* -0.242** -0.001 
ROA        1 0.097 0.003 
IH         1 -0.110* 
Ind          1 
Manufacturing Industry Sample (N = 183) 
 Q CD BS AC FL FS ROA IH 
Q  1 0.176* 0.076 0.195** 0.338** 0.249** -0.010 0.057 
CD   1 0.141 0.117 0.036 0.096 0.106 0.044 
BS    1 0.532** 0.269** 0.563** -0.040 -0.233** 
AC     1 0.078 0.379** 0.005 -0.199** 
FL      1 0.372** -0.244** -0.151* 
FS       1 -0.046 -0.227** 
ROA        1 0.093 
IH         1 
Service Industry Sample (N = 150) 
 Q CD BS AC FL FS ROA IH 
Q  1 0.000 0.037 0.104 0.594** 0.201* 0.014 0.054 
CD   1 0.007 -0.040 -0.029 0.200* 0.016 -0.178* 
BS    1 0.348** 0.221** 0.345** -0.002 -0.029 
AC     1 0.107 0.257** -0.042 -0.023 
FL      1 0.337** -0.252** 0.005 
FS       1 -0.251** -0.269** 
ROA        1 0.103 
IH         1 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
Q = Tobin’s Q 
CD = CEO duality 
BS = Board size 
AC = Audit committee 
FL = Financial leverage 
FS = Firm size 
ROA = Return on assets  
IH = Insider holdings 
Ind = Industry 
 
4. Regression Analysis, Findings, Discussion, Conclusion, Limitations, and 
Future Research 
 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) multiple regression analysis was used to conduct data analysis. 
Multiple regression analysis is useful to find the influence of more than one independent variable 
on the dependent variable (Zainodin et al., 2011) and it allows researchers to explicitly control 
for many other factors that simultaneously affect the dependent variable. Therefore, multiple 
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regression analysis is useful to test the relationships between independent and dependent 
variables.  
 
4.1 Regression Analysis and Findings 
 
Overall, a negative relationship between BS and Q was found (see Table 4); that is, larger board 
size negatively impacts the value of American firms. Positive relationships i) CD and Q, ii) AC 
and Q, iii) FL and Q, iv) FS and Q, v) ROA and Q, and IH and Q were found; that is, CEO 
duality, audit committee, financial leverage, firm size, return on assets, and insider holdings 
positively impact the value of the American firms. A non-significant relationship between Ind 
and Q was found; that is, the impact of corporate governance and financial leverage differs 
between manufacturing and service industries.   
  
In the manufacturing industry, a negative relationship between BS and Q was found (see Table 
4); that is, larger board size negatively impacts the value of American manufacturing firms. 
Positive relationships i) CD and Q, ii) AC and Q, iii) FL and Q, iv) FS and Q, and v) IH and Q 
were found; that is, CEO duality, audit committee, financial leverage, firm size, and insider 
holdings positively impact the value of American manufacturing firms. A non-significant 
relationship between ROA and Q was found; that is, return on assets has no impact on the value 
of American manufacturing firms.   
 
In the service industry, a negative relationship between BS and Q was found (see Table 4); that 
is, larger board size negatively impacts the value of American service firms. Positive 
relationships i) FL and Q and ii) ROA and Q were found; that is, financial leverage and return on 
assets positively impact the value of American service firms. Non-significant relationships 
between i) CD and Q, ii) AC and Q, iii) FS and Q, and iv) IH and Q were found; that is, CEO 
duality, audit committee, firm size, and insider holdings have no impact on the value of 
American service firms.   
 
Table 4: OLS Regression Estimates on Factors Affecting Firm Value 
a, b, c 
 
Entire Sample (N = 333) 
[R2 = 0.238; Adjusted R2 = 0.219; SEE = 2.61; F = 12.64; ANOVA’s Test Sig. = 0.000] 
Regression Equation: Q = -3.132 + 0.595*CD - 0.219*BS + 0.370*AC + 6.834*FL + 0.611*FS + 6.225*ROA + 
2.179*IH + 0.231*Ind  
 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized  
Coefficients c 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
 (Constant) -3.132 1.014  -3.089 0.002   
CD 0.595 0.294 0.101 2.025 0.044 0.954 1.048 
BS -0.219 0.075 -0.174 -2.929 0.004 0.668 1.496 
AC 0.370 0.119 0.172 3.099 0.002 0.766 1.305 
FL 6.834 0.867 0.425 7.883 0.000 0.809 1.236 
FS 0.611 0.285 0.128 2.145 0.033 0.660 1.514 
ROA 6.225 3.052 0.103 2.039 0.042 0.920 1.087 
IH 2.179 1.045 0.105 2.084 0.038 0.921 1.086 
Ind 0.231 0.297 0.039 0.778 0.437 0.940 1.064 
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Manufacturing Industry Sample (N = 183) 
[R2 = 0.220; Adjusted R2 = 0.189; SEE = 3.16; F = 7.05; ANOVA’s Test Sig. = 0.000] 
Regression Equation: Q = -3.773 + 1.010*CD - 0.353*BS + 0.556*AC + 6.624*FL + 1.010*FS + 3.210*ROA + 
3.961*IH  
 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized  
Coefficients c 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
 (Constant) -3.773 1.550  -2.435 0.016   
CD 1.010 0.488 0.141 2.071 0.040 0.959 1.043 
BS -0.353 0.139 -0.228 -2.532 0.012 0.549 1.821 
AC 0.556 0.194 0.230 2.865 0.005 0.691 1.447 
FL 6.624 1.465 0.339 4.521 0.000 0.792 1.262 
FS 1.010 0.471 0.183 2.147 0.033 0.612 1.634 
ROA 3.210 5.160 0.043 0.622 0.535 0.922 1.084 
IH 3.961 2.091 0.133 1.895 0.060 0.911 1.098 
Service Industry Sample (N = 150) 
[R2 = 0.406; Adjusted R2 = 0.376; SEE = 1.65; F = 13.84; ANOVA’s Test Sig. = 0.000] 
Regression Equation: Q = -1.779 + 0.058*CD - 0.136*BS + 0.132*AC + 7.174*FL + 0.270*FS + 7.924*ROA + 
0.636*IH  
 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized  
Coefficients c 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
 (Constant) -1.779 1.010  -1.761 0.080   
CD 0.058 0.280 0.014 0.208 0.835 0.923 1.083 
BS -0.136 0.063 -0.157 -2.153 0.033 0.785 1.273 
AC 0.132 0.117 0.079 1.129 0.261 0.851 1.175 
FL 7.174 0.794 0.643 9.035 0.000 0.826 1.211 
FS 0.270 0.276 0.077 0.978 0.330 0.669 1.494 
ROA 7.924 2.812 0.194 2.818 0.006 0.886 1.128 
IH 0.636 0.851 0.051 0.747 0.456 0.898 1.114 
a Dependent Variable: Q (Firm value) 
b Independent Variables: CD, BS, AC, FL, FS, ROA, IH, and Ind 
c Linear Regression through the Origin 
SEE = Standard Error of the Estimate 
 
Note that: 
 
● A test for multicollinearity was performed. All the variance inflation factor (VIF) coefficients 
are less than 2 and tolerance coefficients are greater than 0.50. Multicollinearity refers to a 
situation in which two or more explanatory variables in a multiple regression model are highly 
linearly correlated. Multicollinearity can be perfect if the correlation between two independent 
variables is equal to 1 or -1. The issue of multicollinearity arises when there is a strong linear 
relationship among two or more independent variables. VIF is useful to detect whether one 
predictor has a strong linear association with the remaining predictors (Lazaridis and Tryfonidis, 
2006). As a rule of thumb, tolerance of less than 0.10 and VIF greater than 9 indicate a 
multicollinearity problem. To explain further, VIF of 9 indicates that (all other things being 
equal) the variance of the ith regression coefficient is 9 times greater than it would have been if 
the ith independent variable had been linearly independent of the other independent variable(s) in 
the analysis. Thus, it explains how much the variance has been inflated by this lack of 
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independence. VIF greater than 9 creates problems for researchers because it leads to poor 
results in regression analysis. The elimination of one or more of the independent variables that 
are highly correlated with the other independent variables can minimize poor regression results 
issues (O’Brien, 2007).  
 
● Overall, Ind, FS, ROA, CD, IH, AC, FL, and BS explain 23.8% of the variance in Q. 
 
● In the manufacturing industry, IH, CD, ROA, AC, FL, FS, and BS explain 22% of the variance 
in Q. 
 
● In the service industry, IH, FL, AC, CD, ROA, BS, and FS explain 40.6% of the variance in Q. 
 
4.2 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this study was to find the impact of corporate governance and financial leverage 
on the value of American firms. Overall findings show that larger board size negatively impacts 
the value of American firms, and CEO duality, audit committee, financial leverage, firm size, 
return on assets, and insider holdings positively impact the value of American firms. The impact 
of corporate governance and financial leverage differs between manufacturing and service 
industries.  
 
Results show that board size negatively impacts the value of American manufacturing firms, and 
CEO duality, audit committee, financial leverage, firm size, and insider holdings positively 
impact the value of American manufacturing firms.  
 
Findings also show that board size negatively impacts the value of American service firms, and 
financial leverage and return on assets positively impact the value of American manufacturing 
firms.  
 
The findings of this study lend some support to the findings of Black (2001), Gompers et al. 
(2003), Klapper and Love (2004), Mak and Kusnadi (2005), Sharma (2006), Pattanayak (2008), 
Rouf (2011), Gill and Mathur (2011a), Ryu and Yoo (2011), Cheng and Tzeng (2011), Adeyemi 
and Oboh (2011), and Cuong and Canh (2012). The findings of this study, however, contradict 
the findings of Ruan, Tian, and Ma (2011). Table 5 shows the summary of the findings of 
previous authors related to the impact of corporate governance and financial leverage on firm 
value.  
 
Table 5: Previous Findings on the Impact of Corporate Governance and Financial Leverage on 
Firm Value  
  
Author Findings  Country/Markets 
Black (2001) Found that a firm's corporate governance behavior can have a huge effect 
on its market value. 
Russia 
Gompers et al. (2003) Found that the firms with stronger shareholder rights had higher firm 
value; that is, strong corporate governance improves the value of the firm. 
USA 
Klapper and Love (2004) Findings suggest that firms can partially compensate for ineffective laws 
and enforcement by establishing good corporate governance and 
providing credible investor protection.  
Emerging Markets 
11 
 
Mak and Kusnadi (2005) Found a negative relationship between the board size and the firm value. Singapore and Malaysia 
Sharma (2006) Found that there is a direct relationship between firm value and financial 
leverage. 
India 
Pattanayak (2008) Found that firm value (measured by Tobin's Q) increases as ownership by 
insiders rises.  
India 
Rouf (2011) Found a positive relationship between CEO duality and firm value.  Bangladesh 
Gill and Mathur (2011a) Found that board size negatively impact of firm value, and CEO duality, 
firm size, and return on assets positively impact the firm’s value.  
Canada 
Ryu and Yoo (2011) Found a positive relationship between firm value and inside management 
ownership. 
Korea 
Ruan, Tian, and Ma (2011) Found that managerial ownership negatively impacts the ratio of total debt 
to total assets and the ratio of total debt to total assets negatively impacts 
firm value.  
China 
Cheng and Tzeng (2011) Found a positive relationship between leverage and firm value. Taiwan 
Adeyemi and Oboh (2011) Found that the market value of a firm is positively influenced by its choice 
of capital structure (financial leverage). 
Nigeria 
Cuong and Canh (2012) Found that the optimal debt ratio (total debt to total assets ratio) of less 
than 59.27% enhances firm value.   
Vietnam 
 
In conclusion, larger board size is not in the favor of American firms because it has a negative 
impact on the value of the firm. Therefore, American firms should use an optimal board size 
based on firm size.  
 
The CEO duality improves the value of the firm. Therefore, it can be considered in favor of 
American firms. Although CEO duality improves the value of the firm, it may not be beneficial 
for very large multinational firms. The CEO may take high risk to expand in the global market to 
increase the value of the firm. CEO duality may also lead to an agency problem. For example, 
the CEO may not work in the favor of internal and external stakeholders to maximize their 
wealth. Therefore, CEO duality should be used with caution (Gill and Mathur, 2011, p. 11).  
 
Results also show that audit committee, financial leverage, firm size, return on assets, and insider 
holdings improve the value of American firms. Although, financial leverage helps enhance firm 
value, higher financial leverage can lead to bankruptcy. According to Cuong and Canh (2012), 
the optimal debt ratio (total debt to total assets ratio) should not exceed 59.27% because a higher 
debt ratio negatively impacts firm value.  
 
CEO duality, board size, audit committee, and financial leverage are positively correlated with 
firm size (see Table 3); that is, larger firm size leads to CEO duality, larger board size, larger 
audit committee, and higher financial leverage. Although, CEO duality and larger audit 
committee are in the favor of the firm, higher financial lavage should be used with caution 
because it can lead to bankruptcy. Large audit committee is, however, in the favor of the 
American firm because it helps improve the firm value by monitoring the CEO and board 
actions. Audit committee monitoring forces the CEO and board of directors to work in the favor 
of shareholders and maximize stakeholders’ wealth. In addition, an audit committee minimizes 
agency problem by improving the flow of information between managers (agent) and 
shareholders (principal).  
 
The positive impact of insider holdings (shareholdings by executives, managers, and employees) 
on firm value (see Table 4) explains that managers and employees work hard to maximize firm 
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value, which in turn, maximizes shareholders’ wealth. Therefore, stock options compensation for 
executives, managers, and employees may be beneficial for the American firms to improve their 
market values.  
   
4.3 Limitations 
 
The sample size of this study is small. This study is limited to American manufacturing and 
service firms. Therefore, the findings of this study could only be generalized to firms similar to 
those that were included in this research.  
 
4.4 Future Research 
 
Future research should include a large sample from different countries. Future study should 
include other variables such as board composition, CEO tenure, and institutional ownership.  
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